

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PROPOSED SPECIAL ESTIMATE ON
CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA WITH RESPECT TO AN ARMISTICE

Problem: Once an armistice has been established between the UN Command the Communist military forces in Korea, what will be the capabilities and probable courses of action of the Republic of Korea (ROK) toward the armistice, through 1954.

Assumption: For the purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that (1) the armistice will be established on the basis of the present draft armistice agreement, (2) the US or UN Command will not make any assurances to the Communists concerning the ROK in addition to those already made, and (3) the ROK will not make any additional new assurances concerning the armistice.

I. Capabilities of the Present ROK Government to Disrupt an Armistice

1. What are the bases of, and what are the limits upon, President Rhee's civil authority?
 - a. The control mechanism: administrative agencies and mass organizations.
 - b. The non-Communist political opposition.
 - c. Popular attitudes.
2. How and to what degree does President Rhee exercise control over ROK military forces? (and conversely what degree of independence do military leaders display?)
 - a. ROK forces under UN tactical command.
 - b. Other ROK forces.

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3. What measures could the ROK Government adopt in an effort to disrupt
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the armistice?

- a. What are ROK capabilities to conduct independent military operations against the Communist forces? (Various assumptions might be made concerning total ROK strength and supply levels).
- b. What other disruptive measures could the ROK undertake?

II. Policy Objectives and Interests of the ROK with respect to:

1. Unification.
2. Security, including foreign military and political alignments.
3. Economic rehabilitation.

III. Courses of Action

In light of its capabilities, what actions bearing on the armistice are apt to be taken by the ROK Government to implement these policy objectives?

IV. What would be the International Reactions to these Courses of Action?

1. Communist reactions.
2. Non-Communist reactions.

V. Conclusions

1/ No effort would be made to estimate the prospects for success of any such measures over UN or US opposition.